Abstract: This paper explores the aesthetic case for landscape conservation. The main claim is that the experience of beautiful landscapes is an essential part of human flourishing;i ti sn ot justa ne nriching option for all of us and, certainly, not merelyasubjective preference for some of us. Beautifullandscapes can make us feel at home in the world; this constitutes their great and irreplaceable value.
Kurzeck'swalk does not lead through aforest,but onlythrough apiece of forest. Ar eal forest is large and deep;y ou can enter deepi nto it.S uch an inside does not exist in ap iece of forest.Apiece of forest is not af orest anymore.
Between the trees in the piece of forest,t here is nothing left,n ou ndergrowth, no shrubs,n of lowers.E vent he trees do not lookl iker eal trees any more-they look more like fakes,highlypraised in the excited languageofadvertising that culminates in the paradoxical cry: "Directlya lmost liker eal!"
We are unable to resonatew ith such trees, with such ap iece of forest,with such highlya rtificial nature. It seems that in aw orld liket his,w ea lsoh ave stopped resonatingw ith and between ourselves. Yet, behind this dead quiet, the cars on the motorwaya re roaringl ouder and louder.T he machine world seems to be the onlyt hing that still grows as nature used to grow.The machine world threatens us. It intoxicates us.
2T he Concept of Landscape
To clarify the concept of landscape, we must first look at the concept of nature. As Aristotle alreadyt aughtu si nh is Physics,n ature is that part of the world which has not been made by human beingsb ut comes into existencea nd vanishes by virtue of itself. Artifacts are the opposites of nature in this sense; they are made by human beings. The distinction between nature and artifacts is polar or gradual (like the distinction between light and dark)a nd not binary or dichotomous (like the distinction between being pregnant and not pregnant); one cannot be alittle bit pregnant,but it can be more or less light or dark. There is hardlyany untouched natureo ne arth anymore. Most of what we call nature, the conservation of which we are concerned with, lies, in fact,b etween the extremes of pure nature and pure artifact.Itisamix of the natural and the artificial in which the naturala spect prevails.
In nature, we can distinguish naturalorganisms and things(like plants and rocks) from largern atural units (like landscapes). Although most landscapes todaya re cultivated and not wild, they are not necessarilyl ess beautiful; consider,f or example, the garden-likeE nglish landscape.
There is no sharp boundary between landscapes and gardens (or parks), as again England'slandscape gardens show. Gardens are, first,laid out for aesthetic enjoyment and in this respect they fall somewhereb etween art and nature; second, they usuallys urround ah ouse and are themselvess urrounded by a fence, so that they mediate between the house and the landscape.
Landscapesa re especiallyp ertinent to the experience of natural resonance. This is because they are relativelyf ree from human ends. Yeto ne can certainly also resonatew ith nature in gardens and parks, as well as with singular organisms and natural things. But let us focus here on landscapes.
To understand landscapes as largern atural units is onlyo ne of manyw ays of understandingt hem. This modest,e verydayu nderstanding (2.1), which Io pt for here, must be distinguished from two more demanding aesthetic ones (2.2 and 2.3). The reason whyIprefer the first understanding will emerge in the next section (3).
LargerN atural Unit
In twelfth-century Old High German, "lantscaf" denoted al argern atural area and its population. In fifteenth-centuryN etherlands, the term could alsor efer to ap ainting of al argern atural unit.A rt historians still talk of landscapes in these terms. Today, the boundaries of landscapes are no longer political, as they werei nt he beginning,a nd as the German synonym "Gebiet" (from "gebieten" =torule) makes explicit.AsIsuggest in the next section on "Stimmung",for us it is atmosphere that constitutes the unity of landscapes.
LargerN atural Unit in Aesthetic Contemplation
Accordingtothis aesthetic understanding,you encounter landscapes onlywhen youa ttend to what is around you for its own sake. Youd on ot experience landscapes when all youa re looking for is recreation or research.
LargerN atural Unit in Autonomous Aesthetic
Contemplation 3T he Concept of "Stimmung"
This section presents "Stimmung",o ra tmosphere, as the unifying principle of landscapes,t aking up ap roposal that GeorgS immel made in his classic piece on the philosophyo fl andscape ah undred years ago. The German word "Stimmung" is untranslatable (arguablymoreuntranslatable than "Heimat" wherebeing at home at least comes close). "Stimmung" embraces three phenomena while its English and French counterparts ("mood", "attunement", "ambiance", "humeur" or "atmosphère")u suallye mbrace onlyone or two. The three phenomena are harmony, mood, and atmosphere (cf. Wellbery 2003).
Harmony
Being in tune or in harmonyisthe original sixteenth century meaning of "Stimmung".Musical instruments were said to be in tune or integratedand readytobe played, and later,i nt he eighteenth century,the same was said about the faculties of the human soul. ImmanuelK ant,i nh is Critique of Judgement,f amously talks about the harmony("proportionierte Stimmung")ofthe faculties of imagination and understanding ("Einbildungskraft und Verstand")inaesthetic contemplation.
Mood
Moodsb elong to the sphere of mental human feeling;t hey are not just bodily feelingss uch as toothache, nauseao rf atigue. In contrastt os tandard emotions (rage, sorrow or joy), which are directed at something or other in particular, moods (sadness or cheerfulness) have no specific objects, but are rather about life and the world at large.M oods integrate us. Them usicalm etaphor of "Stimmung" as introduced in the last paragraph highlights the holistic character of moods. Moods synthesize what we feel into am oreo rl ess harmonious whole. They ensure that we hang togethera ffectively and don'tfalltopieces.Nevertheless, therea re times when we do fall to pieces,a nd in this sense, we are not always in am ood.
There are two major kinds of moods: transitory (as in "moody")a nd enduring.Unlikethe connotation of "mood" in English, which privileges the first kind, "Stimmung" is wider and refers equallyt ot he second kind. The so-called "be-ständigeL ebensstimmungen" are longer lasting and more reliable or world-disclosing than the short-term and capricious "Launen" (see Bollnow1 995;G oldie 2000:c hapter seven; and Ratcliffe 2008) .
Moodsc an be shared among human beings. Such inter-human or collective affects, be they the resultofi nfection as in mass panic, or of true-that is, sympathetic or dialogical-sharing,a re alsoc alled collective "atmospheres".I na ddition to such inter-human atmospheres,there are also nonhuman atmospheres (which in turn can be shared by us viainfection or sympathy, as will be explored later in section 5).
Atmosphere
When nonhuman entities such as landscapes,cities, buildingsorroomsare said to have an aura or an atmosphere,t hey are regarded not onlya si ntegrated wholes (as in 3.1) but also as full of feeling,e .g.f ull of peace or melancholy (as in 3.2).T he atmospheres of landscapes changew ith the weather,t he time of daya nd the season. These transitory atmospheresc an be distinguished from the more enduringa tmosphere,g estalt or character of landscapes.T he character of landscapes depends on their physiognomy, climate and history. Both the enduringand the transitory atmospheres of landscapes are not merely subjective phenomena, even if subjective factors like personal memories and personal moods also playarole in actual landscape experience.
Landscape character is the principle of unity behind the first,modest concept of landscape in section 2. As not all experiences of atmospheric largern atural units are aesthetic rather than hedonisticorscientific, the two more demanding, aesthetic concepts of landscape in section 2d oi ndeeds eem toon arrow.
Where alarge naturalarea loses its character through anatural catastrophe or human destruction, it lacks the unity necessary for being alandscape. It turns into an expressionless heterogeneity,i nto an on-place or landscape garbage. It does not turn into an ugly "landscape".Uglylandscapes are the opposites of aestheticallya ttractive and, in this broad sense,b eautifull andscapes.
Not every landscape changea mounts to landscape destruction though.The changecan alsobefor the good. The Golden Gate Bridge,which spans the Golden Gate Strait between San Francisco Bayand the Pacific Ocean, might be an example of the latter. "to what extent can the mood of al andscape be located within it,objectively, givent hat it is amental state,and can thus reside alone in the emotional reflexes of the beholder and not in the unconscious external objects?" (Simmel 2007:26-27) There are manyphilosophical responses to this question, including thatthe question is misconceived. It is advisable to start with this last response before looking at four major explanations of how landscapes "acquire" moods: the projective,t he causal, the associative,a nd the metaphorical models.
Phenomenologists such as Martin Heidegger, Otto Friedrich Bollnow,H ermann Schmitz, and Gernot Böhme maintain that asking how "Stimmung" is infused into landscape is the wrong question to ask. "Stimmung" is alreadyo ut there. When we movei nl andscapes we enter their "Stimmungen";the phenomenon of "Stimmung" lies before the divide between subject and world. Hereisa quote from Otto Friedrich Bollnow'sc lassic Das Wesen der Stimmungen from 1941:
In "Stimmung",the world has not yetb ecome an object,a si td oes afterwards in the later forms of consciousness, especiallyi nk nowing; rather, "Stimmungen" still live entirelyi n the unseparated unity of self and world, with ashared colouringof"Stimmung" pervading both. That is whyitisalso wrongtoassign "Stimmung" solelytothe subjective side and to assume that it then, in as ense, rubs off on the world. (Bollnow 1995:39, my translation) This might seem atemptingexplanation, but can it reallyapplytoadult human beingsw ho experience "Stimmungen"?C an adults not differentiate between artistic exemplification, look at Müller'sset of pictures 1973,orlisten to the passages 5and 8on the second cd of Peter Kurzeck'sa udio book 2007. themselvesa nd the world when they feel, for example, sad in acheerful crowd, an amusingt heatre play, ah omelys treet,o rabright landscape? It seems they can and do.
To be sure, whens ad they might find it difficult to be open to,torealize, to attend to, or even to share to some extent the incongruous positive atmosphere around them.A sw ith moods, stronge motions alsoh avet his tendency to spill over,t or ub off on theirs urroundings. Their lack of exact fit is ap rice we have to payf or their immediacy.T hroughout our lives, we work on improvingt his fit through "sentimental education".D espite this somewhat irrational tendency in our moods and emotions, we can and do distinguish between them and the state of our surroundings.
It therefore seems that Otto Friedrich Bollnow has toop rimitive an idea of "Stimmungen".W hat he says about the undivided unity between self and world mayh old for babiesa nd for some animals, but it does not seem apposite for adults. Human beingsm ight indeed begin their livesw ith what Sigmund Freud called the oceanic feeling of being one with the universe, and what Max Scheler and Maurice Merleau-Ponty referred to as identification or pre-communication.H owever,this primary unity must be distinguishedf rom the differentiated unity that laterd evelops upon its basis and thatc haracterizes adultm oods. While babiesm ight just find themselvesa th ome in or at one with the world, adults must open up to the atmosphere around them and make themselvesa t home. Foradults, the issue of how moods permeate landscapes,buildingsorartworks and how we respond to them remains aq uestion.
The transitionfrom primary unity to adultself-world differentiation is gradual. As the psychiatrist Ulrich Gebhard reports in his 1994 study Kind und Natur (cf. Gebhard 1994), small children perceive both the natural and the artificial world around them accordingt ot hemselvesa nd theirc urrent states.A ta ges 6t o7 ,achild still believes everything to have consciousness.A ta round the ageof8 ,this is limited to moving things; at around 11 it applies onlyt omoving things; and finally at age1 2o nlyt oa nimals.
Gebhard,i nf act,b elieves that child-likea nimism never fullyl eavesu s. According to him, adults still "feedoff" of these past experiencesofunity,and borders thata re toor igid are damaging.When we reach old age, we often become like children again. As he sees it,our enlightened scientificworldview manages to conceal the magical with onlyaflimsy layer.
As against Gebhard, Ifear that we cannot have it both ways.Wecannot both be scientifically literate and realizethat landscapes are non-sentient,and yetbelievethat they are somehow sentient nevertheless.Ithus conclude that we have to confront the question of how "Stimmung" is infused into landscape. Let us now turn to four major answers to this question.
Projective Model
This model harks back to our childhood,too. It differs from the preceding one in that first,i tf ullya cknowledgest he legitimacy of the question and, second, employs another psychological mechanism to account for moods in landscapes: projection instead of completeo rp artial unity.
Richard Wollheim has worked out the projective model in some detail (cf. Wollheim 1993) . Forh im, the mechanism of projection lies at the heart of the phenomenon of expression both in art and landscape. While we find expression in landscapes, in art it is created by the artists.
As Wollheim explains, projection is an internal act that we carry out under instinctualg uidance, when we are either in am ental state that we value (like loveo rc uriosity) and that we seea su ndert hreat,o ri nastate that we dread (like cruelty or melancholy) and by which we find ourselvesthreatened. Anxiety alerts us to this situation and projection alters it,b ringingu ss ome relief from this anxiety.A tt he beginning of life, projection occurs in at otallyh aphazard fashion. Onlylater does it become more orderlyand the parts of the environment upon which features are projected are selected because of theira ffinityt othese feelings. In consequence, these parts of the environment are experienced as of a piece with these feelings.
Wollheim understands landscape atmospheres as complex projective properties. We identify them through experiences thatw eh ave; in this regard they are like secondary properties, such as colors,which would not exist if no one was there to see them. But projective properties differ from such secondary properties in being not onlyp erceptual but also affective,w ith the affectiond irected not merelyt owardsw hat is in front of one but also towards some older and more dominant object.T he experience intimates or reveals a history,s ometimes its own, usuallyo nlyt he kind of projective history of how it might have arisen.
Simple projection projects an unwelcome psychological property onto another figure with psychology, thereby changing primarilyt he beliefs about this figure, whereas complex projection projects an unwelcome psychological property onto an environment without psychology, thereby changingp rimarilyo ur attitude and not our beliefs.F urthermore, the property itself is changed; the peaceful character of the landscape is experienced not as astate of mind that inheres in the landscape irrespective of ourselves, but as continuous with our own peacefulness, as of ap iece with it. This is an ingenious proposal. Yeta gain it seems to be too much drivenb y childhood needs, and negative ones for that matter,b eing too concerned with child-likea nxiety and its relief to do justicet ot he differentiated quality of adultm oods and their experience of landscape atmospheres.
Causal Model
Accordingt ot his much more straightforward model, ap eaceful landscapeo nly makes us feel peaceful. The landscapei sn ot reallyp eaceful itself. To call it peaceful is al oose mannero fs peaking,a ttributing back to it the feeling it has triggered in us.
That landscapes have causal effects on us is beyond doubt.Johann Wolfgang Goethe, in his theory of colors for example, exploredthe psychological effects of colors,such as the soothing impact of the color green. Today, such causal effects are systematicallyu sedi nl ight therapy against winter depression.
Associative Model
This is another uncomplicated and popular model. It explains the peacefulness of alandscapebyits power to make us think of something peaceful, because we connect it with something or it resembles something (like the face of aS aint Bernhard dog resembles as ad human face). But,a gain, the landscapei sn ot reallyp eaceful itself.
The problem with both models, the causal as wellast he associative,i sthat they fail to capturet hat the peaceful feelingi si ntimatelyr elated to the landscape. How the landscape looks, soundsorsmells is integral to afull description of the feeling.C ontrast this with ab ottle of wine that makesy ou cheerful and reminds youo ft he good old days.T od escribey our cheerfulness, youd on ot need to talk about how the wine tastes.T he peacefulness is in the landscape, whereas the cheerfulness is not in the wine. Causal effects and associations are tooexternal to account for the "within-ness" or integrality of moods in landscapes.
Metaphorical Model
Accordingt ot his last model, landscapes can indeedb ep eaceful in themselves, but not in the literal sense. In recent aesthetics, Nelson Goodman, Jerrold Levinson and Roger Scruton explicated this model for the arts. In music, for example, Roger Scruton distinguishesthree levels: the primary and physical level of vibrations in the air;the secondary and phenomenal level of heard sounds, "audibilia" that the deaf person cannot hear; and the tertiary and musicall evel of tones heard in the sounds. To hear tones in music moving up and down, attracting and repellingeach other, striving forward and lingering,crying out and comfortOn Natural Resonance ing is to hear sounds through the metaphor of human life, of human movement in space, of human action and feeling.Ametaphor is the deliberative application of at erm or phrase to something that is known not to exemplify it,e .g.when Monday is called ab lue day. By fusingd issimilar things, the thing'sa spect is changed, so that one responds to it in adifferent way. Hearingmusic, experiencing its moods, is metaphorical hearing.I ti sh earing with double intentionality, hearing both sounds and tones by hearing tones in sounds (cf. Scruton 1997) .
Following on from this understanding,l andscapea tmospheres can be understood as tertiarya spects like moods in music. Landscape atmospheres are as real as their colors and soundso nt he secondary level, which in turn are as real as the light wavesand the air vibrations on the primary level. As Roger Scruton puts it:
Because we ares ubjects the world looks back at us with aq uestioningr egard, and we respond by organizingand conceptualizingitinother ways than those endorsed by science. The world as we live it is not the world as sciencee xplainsi t, anym oret han the smile of the Mona Lisa is as mear of pigments on ac anvas. But this livedw orld is as real as the Mona Lisa'ss mile. (Scruton 2012: 128 -129) Babies and some animalsn either experiencea tmospheres in this sense, nor do they see landscapes.They can onlybesaid to feel atmospheres in the much simpler sense of primary(more or less porous) unity.Metaphoricalexperience, seeing xint erms of y, which it is not literallybut which fits and reveals something about it,i sahigh achievement;i tr equires close attention and imagination. Poets are particularlys killed at this. They find "am agic word" and make "the world sing"-as Joseph Freiherr vonE ichendorff famouslyp uts it.
The metaphorical model bears some similaritytothe projective model. Metaphors are also "projective",but in am uch moreg eneral sense than the anxietydrivenp sychoanalytic one employed in the projective model.
5S ome BasicT ypes of Experience
In order to preparethe ground for the specificallyaesthetic type of landscape experience, four more basic types should be distinguished: perception (or understanding), empathy( or vicarious/reproduced feeling), sympathy (or fellow feeling) and infection. The contemporary debate on empathy, in which "empathy" can mean anyofthese different phenomena, still needstoregain the conceptual standard that phenomenologyreached at the beginning of the last century,most notablyi nt he writingso fM ax Scheler and Edith Stein (see Scheler 1954; a nd Stein 1989 ;for asummary and elaboration of Scheler'sposition, cf. Krebs 2011).
Perception
When we perceive that al andscapei sp eaceful, we remain affectively moreo r less neutral. We simply realize that it is peaceful (in the metaphorical sense). It does not require much attention or imagination to recognize the atmospheres of landscapes,aspoetry and othercreative arts have pavedthe wayfor us. We do not need to be aestheticallya ctive ourselvest or espond to landscapes,a sJ oachim Ritter and before him Georg Simmel seem to have thought( cf. 2.3).
Empathy
When we empathize with ap eaceful landscape, we move with its atmosphere, enactingitbut not sharing it.Asthe example of cruelty makes it clear,empathy occupies an intermediateposition between perception and sympathy. Cruel people are not sympathetic to the sufferingo ft heirv ictims, but they still need empathyi no rder to fullye njoy theirv ictims' pain.
Sympathy
When we sympathize with ap eaceful landscape, we move with its atmosphere and share it.W er esonatee motionally, as we do when we listent oafavorite piece of music. Sympathyi sa ne motion in the full sense, includingb odilyf eeling,cognitive evaluation and behavior,while empathyis"only" avivid mode of cognitive understanding;a lthough in certain cases empathyc an lead to actual emotions, it does not necessarilydoso. Sympathycomes in two variants:participatory sympathyand meta-sympathy.Onlythe first is relevant for landscapes.In the second, we are sad about the sadness or bad situation of another,but we do not accompanyh er through her sadness as in the first variant.
Infection
When we are infected by apeaceful landscape, we are swayedbyits atmosphere.
Infection is causal while perception, empathyand sympathy are intentional; they are directed towards the expressive qualityofthe landscape. In being directed towards an "other",t hey presuppose some distance between self and other.
Infection is not alert to this distance.Infection is relevant for mental healthand wellness,b ut in itself it is not an aesthetic phenomenon.²
6A estheticR esonance
This final section spells out how resonatingaestheticallyw ith landscape atmospheres can make us feelathome in the world. It distinguishes between stronger and weaker understandings.While beauty,e speciallyf unctional beauty,a llows for feeling perfectlyath ome, sublimity affords onlyapartial or ambivalent version.
Aesthetic landscape experience involves not onlya ttending to landscapes closely, perceiving their atmosphere (5.1)a nd empathizing with it (5.2), but also enteringi ta nd sharing it (5.3)f or its owns ake. In stressingt he "intrinsicness" of aesthetic experience,aswell as the distance that is constituent of sympathy(as it is directed towards an "other"), this understandingisreminiscent of Kant'saesthetics,evenifhis aesthetics is much colder than that.AsJohn Dewey, among manyo thers, observes, sympathetic emotions playn or ole in it: "To define the emotional element of esthetic perception merelyasthe pleasure taken in the act of contemplation, independent of what is excited by the matter contemplated, results, however,i nat horoughly anemicc onception of art." (Dewey 2005:264) Insteadofaesthetic contemplation, Itherefore prefer to speak of aesthetic "resonance".( Iw ill elaborate on the physical metaphor of resonance below.)
Still, in tandem with Kant,i ti si mportant to distinguish between aesthetic experience on the one hand, and physiological and psychological (for example, hedonistic) impact or effect,onthe other.Thisfundamental point is also stressed by Ludwig Wittgenstein in his 1938 Lectures on Aesthetics. Wittgenstein argues that aesthetic reactions-like the discomfort one might feel when ad oor is too low or am usicalp assagei si ncoherent,a nd the appreciation one might feel when as uit is the right length or ap oetic imagei sp recise-are "directed"; there is a "why" to aesthetic reactions, not a "cause" to them. Aesthetics is not "ab ranch of psychology" (LA 1966:1 4, 17) .
 Manyn aturea ctivities combine health and wellness with aesthetics.Think of hikingi nt he mountains or swimminginthe sea. In such combined natureactivities,nature is not replaceable by agym.This irreplaceability adds force to the aesthetic argument for natureconservation. Still, the (replaceable) health and wellness effects of natureare of immense importance too. "Feeling at home" in nature is often duet ot hese effects.N evertheless,i ti sn ot this kind of feelinga t home in naturet hat is explored here.
The main thesis of my paper about how aestheticallya ttractive landscapes can make us feelathomeinthe world does not concern causal impact or effect. Rather,i tc oncerns the quality of the aesthetic experience itself, which can include, as ab y-product,t he moodo ff eelinga th ome.
Like all intrinsic activities, aesthetic sympathetic attention or resonance is accompanied by pleasure. GeorgH enrik vonW right calls this kind of pleasure "active pleasure" and contrasts it with, first, "passivep leasure" such as the good taste of an apple, and, second, the "pleasure of satisfaction",t hat is, the feeling we have when we getw hat we want (cf. Wright 1993: 63 -65) . It is an intricate philosophical problem as to whether active pleasure (as an overall feeling,which might also involvesome struggle and suffering,such as in the process of artistic creation), is aconceptuallynecessary and defining elementofall that is done for its own sake or whether it is onlytypical of it.What is clear,however, is that we cannot intentionallyinduceactivepleasure. It arises onlywhen we are absorbed in the activity and forgeta bout our dailyw orries.I ti saby-product of the activity.M ihalyC sikszentmihalyi has popularizedt he notiono ft he self-forgetful drive,which characterizes active pleasure as flow.
Csikszentmihalyi presents empirical findingstoshow how,i ns ome particularlysuccessfulcases of activelypleasant intrinsic activities, the subjects become aware of themselvesaspartofalargerwhole. As he sees it,there is nothing esoteric or metaphysical in this: "When aperson invests all her psychicenergy into an interaction-whetheritiswith another person, aboat,amountain, or apiece of music-she in effect becomes part of asystem of action greater than what the individual self had been before." (Csikszentmihalyi 1990:6 5) Because of its holistic direction, this feeling of differentiated unity or being at homec an be regarded as a mood. In contrast, mere active pleasure or flow seems to be "only" an on-intentional bodilyf eeling.
To sum up, the affective quality of aesthetice xperience highlighted so far lies in sympathya nd in flow on the one hand plus,i ns ome cases, the feeling of beinga th ome on the other. The physical metaphoro fr esonance underlines this affectiveq uality.
However,t he metaphor of resonancem ight be misleading in at least three ways.F irst,p hysical resonanceo ccurs when one object vibratesw ith another at the same or as imilar natural frequency,e .g.when the G-and D-stringso fa violin vibrate with aG -major chord on ap iano. This is a causal phenomenon, whereas aesthetic resonancei sf irst and foremost intentional sympathy.³  The metaphor of resonancethereforealso fits non-aesthetic human phenomena such as being infected by laughter or crying, which could be called "causal resonances".Other types of reso-
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Second, physical resonance is not onlyc ausal but also instantaneous;a esthetic resonance, in contrast, requires a "gymnastics of attention" (to borrowa phrase from Roger Scruton). It takes time and effort; onlys ometimes, in learnt spontaneity,d oes it occur instantaneously. We can distinguish the immediate seizure by an aesthetic atmosphere from the discrimination that sets in afterwards,w hich mayo rm ay not validatet he first immediate impression. This first impression is directed and is not to be confused with infection.
Third, physical resonancet ends to be bilateral (and even amplifying:t hink of the famouse xample of marchings oldiers collapsing ab ridge). Not only does the violin resonatewith the piano, the pianoresonates backwith the violin. This has led Hartmut Rosa to conceptualize resonance in general, includingaesthetic resonance, as am utualp henomenon. Forh im, resonancei sn ot an echo relation, but ar esponser elation; it requires that bothp arties speak with their own voices.I na esthetic resonance, as he has it,n ot onlyd ow er espond to the world, the world also responds to us (cf. Rosa 2016:2 98) . This mutualc oncept of aesthetic resonance, however,s lips into metaphysics,a sn ature does not respond to us in anyl iteral sense. To distinguish Rosa'sc oncept from mine, his would better be called "rosanence".What Rosam ight have in mind is the Eichendorffian phenomenon of the magic word, which sounds the song that sleeps in all things. Soberlyu nderstood, this phenomenon is nothing but our feeling thato ur metaphors fit the world. We create our metaphors but we cannot createt he fit.The fit must happen by itself. If it does, it feels as if the world responds to us and begins to sing.
Beauty
Landscapesare beautiful,inthe broad sense, when they invite and rewardintrinsic sympathetic attention or resonance. Their appeal, similar to the appeal of everything thatisbeautiful, is not limited to some of us, but open to all. Aesthetic landscape resonance is not just as ubjective preference, as travel guides and art criticism prove. It is au niversallya ccessible form that the desire for beauty can take. The desire for beauty is an anthropological constant.F ulfilling this desire in one wayora nother is an important part of the good human life. As mornancea re "biographical resonance" (wheny ou feel at home in your neighborhood) and "social resonance" (when youa re in harmonyw ith certain people, sharinga ctivities,e motionsa nd moods with them). In his book Resonanz (2016), Hartmut Rosa investigates all these types. See also his earlier book Social Acceleration (2013), which views social acceleration as a "resonancek iller". ality requires respect for the essentials of the good life of all human beings, conserving beauty is am oral obligation.
How beautiful landscapes and otherbeautiful objects or ensembles manage to lurea nd satisfy us is, of course, the central question of aesthetics. Classical answers stresss ymmetry,h armonyo ru nity in diversity.M odern answers focus on the experiencing subject.A ccordingt ot he Kantian answer,beautiful objects or ensembles bring our faculties of understanding and imagination into free play. This intellectual Kantian model should at least be complemented by the idea of a "freep layo fs ympathy".I ti sn ot onlyo ur cognitivef aculties that are attracted and challenged by beauty but also our affective powers.B eauty does not onlym ake us think about manyt hings, it also makesu sf eelm anyt hings.
It makes us open up and grow both rationallya nd emotionally.
Do the atmospheric and the beautiful then amount to the same thing (at least for beautiful landscapes and expressive art)? Not necessarily. Something might have as trongp ositive or negative atmosphere in the sense of an overwhelming impact,infectingusbut not inviting us to attend to and sympathize with it for its own sake. Kitsch could be an example of this. We might formulate this point differently: what is merelyatmospheric has an atmosphere,while what is beautiful expresses an atmosphere. If we put the point like this we would, however,beemploying aw eak notion of expression thatw ould allow us to sayt hatb eautiful landscapes express atmospheres.W ec ould not limit the notion of expression to artworks thata dmittedlya re expressive in ad ifferent and deeper sense than landscapes.E xpressive art is ak ind of communication. It has am essage. It pursuesm eaning.I ta rticulates, explores and meditateso nh uman concepts in as tructure all of its own. Expressiveness in art is an achievement.T his does not hold for landscapes.C ompared with art,t he expressiveness of landscapes is as uperficial phenomenon.
Still, landscape beauty is special and cannot be replaced by other kinds of beauty.Ifitwerereplaceable, nothing much would follow from the aesthetic argument in terms of landscape conservation. One reason whylandscape beauty is special is that we experience landscapes synaestheticallyand feel them with all our senses, not onlywith our eyes and ears, which are more capable of aesthetic distance than our noses, tongues and fingers are. We even movearound in landscapes.S ensual feeling and,yes, infection is part and parcel of aesthetic landscape experience. We can thus add infection to the affective aspectsofaesthetic landscape experience outlined so far, which include sympathy, flow and feeling at home. Infection serves to increase the immersive effect of beautiful landscapes,s ot hatw em ay feela th ome in them, boths ensuallya nd aesthetically.
Yet, beautifullandscapesare irreplaceablefirst andforemostbecause they fulfill ourconscious or unconscious longingtobepartof, andnot alienatedfrom, the naturalworld,the worldthati sj ustthere,thatc omes into beingand vanishes by virtue of itself.Beautiful landscapes heal theriftbetween subjectand nature,both then ature outt here andt he nature in us.L iving in harmonyw ithn ature in this sensei sm oret hana ne nriching option foragood life;i ti sa ne ssential part of humanf lourishing.H erei sO ttoF riedrich Bollnow once more:
It is disastrous when humans live in the stonyd eserts of cities,i nr ooms that moreo ften than not arefullyair-conditioned, and arescarcelyaffected anymorebythe changingseasons.F or this reason, it is extremelyimportantthat humans experiencethe rhythms of nature as wella st he rhythms that order their own lives, that they feel the pauses and slow down for them, and then respond to the reawakening of life in the springwith all their energy,experiencingitasaradical renewal. But this can onlyoccurinthe intense experience of the sproutinggreen of nature.A sH ölderlin writes in his lovelyv erses,the "holygreen" "refreshes" us and transforms us into youths again. ( Bollnow 1988:5 5, my translation) Beautiful landscapes teach us how to "dwell on earth",B ollnow continues,f ollowing Martin Heidegger( cf. Heidegger2 013). They give us as ense of place and make us honor it.
Sublimity
There are strongera nd weaker forms of feelinga th omei nn ature. So far Ih ave mainlyt alked about the strongest one, perfect sympathetic coordination,which feels like unity.
Often, however,wesucceed only partially in our attempt at sympathetically moving with something.Our failureneed not be due to ourselves; it could alsobe due to the landscape. The classical distinction between the beautiful and the sublimei sr elevant here. Foro ur purposes, it can be reconstructed as follows: Onlyt he beautiful (now in am ore limited sense than before and no longer synonymous with "aestheticallyattractive")allows us to be fullytaken up in it.The sublime, in its infinite extent and power,entices us to sympatheticallymovewith it,too. The subject enjoys participating in its magnitude and strength. However, the subject also feels painfullyr eminded of her own insignificance and vulnerability.T he sublimec onfronts us with at ension between ac elebration of the landscape and self-negation. Still, insofar as the sublime appeals to us and invites us to partially move with it,n either leaving us cold nor threatening us ex-
